Thomas Schelling and Gameplanning vs. Playcalling

Thomas Schelling, along with Robert Aumann, was honored this week with the nobel prize in economics for his work in Game Theory--or "interactive decision theory". An amazing mind, his books are also extremely readable (i.e. unlike much game theory, they do not overwhelm you with the mathematics).

Since he won I browsed around the web a bit, and, thanks to Marginal Revolution, here is a lecture he gave on the theory of self-restraint.

I suggest reading the essay, as it touches on a variety of interesting and at times troubling issues of self-restraint and individual and public choice. It addresses the boundaries of human capacity and consequences of our abilities and limitations when making decisions.

Schelling begins his lecture:

A few years ago I saw again, after nearly fifty years, the original Moby Dick, an early talkie in black and white. Ahab, in a bunk below deck after his leg is severed by the whale, watches the ship’s blacksmith approach with a red-hot iron which, only slightly cooled by momentary immersion in a bucket of water, is to cauterize his stump. As three seamen hold him he pleads not to be burnt, begging in horror as the blacksmith throws back the blanket. And as the iron touches his body he spews out the apple that he has been chewing, in the most awful scream that at age twelve I had ever heard. Nobody doubts that the sailors who held him did what they had to do, and the blacksmith too. When the story resumes there is no sign that he regrets having been cauterized or bears any grievance toward the men who, rather than defend him against the hot iron, held him at the blacksmith’s mercy. They were not protecting him from an involuntary reflex. And he was not unaware of the medical consequences of an uncauterized wound. Until the iron touched him he knew exactly what was afoot. It was a moment of truth. He was unmistakably all there. He made his petition in clear and understandable language. They had neither personal interest nor legal obligation to subject him to torture. And they disregarded his plea. When the iron struck he went out of his mind, still able, though, to communicate with perfect fidelity that all he wanted was the pain to stop. While the iron was burning his body we might declare him to have been not fully present, but until that instant it is hard to claim that he didn’t understand better than we do what the stakes were.

Ahab and his wound dramatize a phenomenon that, usually not so terrifying, all of us have observed in others and most have observed in ourselves. It is behaving as if two selves were alternately in command. A familiar example is someone who cannot get up when the alarm goes off. [He also mentions examples like how we do not keep candy or alcohol in the house because of expectation of our own future weakness. A poignant example he uses is someone who attempts suicide.]

I don't want to misconstrue Schelling's lecture--it gets much further afield than anything here--but while reading it I was struck with the classic two-self dichotomy that every offensive coordinator in football must deal with: the gameplanner and the playcaller. (We could even probably say the 1st quarter coach vs. the 4th quarter coach, but that is a different discussion.)

Posed with similar circumstances and problems, even the exact same level of information, the in-game you and the weekday you would likely give very different answers. Bill Walsh has often talked about the advantage of scripting plays and playcalling in detached, relaxed circumstances where logic can dictate vs. the insanity of a game situation.

One of the implications is that we must take turns as Ahab and as the crew, holding each other down to see us through what our immediate self vocally rejects. Even going so far as to override us when we are at our weakest. While not as dramatic as Moby Dick or even some of Schelling's other scenarios, it is an interesting view.

Further, a gameplan can be seen as a form of contract with our football team and the other coaches that guarantees that we will stick to what has been decided collectively and with the most information possible. While it is a blueprint for attacking your opponent it is also there to guard against you suddenly becoming Hal Mumme and throwing 50 times when, as a staff, you'd decided to be a lot more like Woody Hayes that game.

The obvious caveat is that a gameplan is contingency based, much of it depends on what your opponent does. But, a well crafted gameplan can still handle these scenarios and be created in a detached setting. In Schelling's language, created by your week-day self.

Notes on Running With the Football

From a press Conference with Notre Dame Coach Charlie Weis:

[In response to a question on running back Darius Walker's running style]

But I can tell you what I used to tell [Patriot's receiver] Deion Branch after I had a big research study on (Marvin) Harrison a few years ago when Deion was a second year [in New England]. I noticed that Marvin, with all of his production, any time the hits were coming, he was going down. So after I thought about it for a while. I thought, this isn't the stupidest thing in the whole world to have your best guy, when he's about ready to get crunched, go ahead and make sure that doesn't happen.... there are times to take the hit and there are times not to take the hit.

The first important point is explicitly made: If you're talking about your best guy, there is logic to letting him go down or go out and bounds and avoid the big crunching hits. While we don't want to coach pansies, you also want to have the kid for the whole season. Injuries are a bigger threat to receivers than say offensive linemen because it is more difficult for them to play through injuries due to the nature of the position.

Second, which can be gleaned since his example was Marvin Harrison, most all production, at least a receiver's, is done before contact is made. This does not limit yards after the catch, but instead tells you that the focus is on running away from defenders rather than at them, either to run them over like Earl Campbell or try to individually juke every guy out, which is idiotic.

Instead, great receivers catch the ball, get upfield immediately, and try to score by splitting defenders. What do I mean by splitting defenders? Quite simply: run inbetween them. There are circumstances when you need to take the hit to the defender (sometimes on a slant all you can do is deliver the "forearm of doom" to the safety after the catch) but, usually, you score by running directly upfield right inbetween the corner and the safety for the long TD.

It's an often missed point. If you watch Sportscenter you will see that almost every short pass that goes for a TD involves a receiver bursting through a seam rather than trying to juke guy X, run through guy Y, spin off guy Z, and then finish by jumping over guy A. Notice I ran out of letters because doing this, even if successful, takes so long that the whole defense has time to show up. It happens occaisionally, but don't make it a habit.

Routes vs. Press Man

Here is a message board response of mine about throwing versus man to man. Lots of the theory stuff is much more applicable to zones; vs. man you just have to beat people. (Though some of the best defenses can actually make you think they are in zone when they play man.)

While I agree that the mesh [two receivers shallow crossing at 6 yards, making a rub] is a great play vs man, it can take a little while to develop. I've definitely seen one or both receivers get jammed and the QB left with nowhere to go with the ball. I don't really think the Kentucky Shallow Cross Series is that inherently great versus press man. [an example play is here, more info can be found here. Both were mentioned in the discussion.]

I think shallow crosses work better versus loose man and zones where you can widen the linebackers. There aren't many rubs and the actual pass to the crosser is not always an easy throw against even a beaten defender; it's kind of is to the side and sometimes even over the defender.

[Another poster] mentioned Spurrier: I also remember watching his Coaching show once when he was at UF, and he said "if they play tight man you're eventually going to have to throw the slant route and the fade route." These are two routes that your receivers must learn to execute one-on-one. Can they beat the man over them?

Further, to help your guys vs press man the simplest thing to do is put your receiver off the ball, i.e. as a flanker. Vary who is on and who is off to give your guys better leverage. Also, simple motions can help too; tough to jam a guy who is in motion (look at Arena football, can't quite do that same thing but the principle applies).

Last, stacks, bunches, and rubs. I group them together but two receivers working together (the essence of the Kentucky mesh, but sometimes putting them to the same side is best) works great. Have them criss cross, follow release, rub, whatever works in your system.

If Purdue sees press man they will invariably go to a really simple combination: a slant by the outside guy with the slot running a fade. The slant runs his break off the hip of the guy running the fade, so they get a "rub". The receiver breaks his route pretty flat at first but then will bend it upfield after a couple steps (he doesn't want to get too far inside, it isn't an in route).

If you are going to install any play versus press man, this is the first and easiest. The QB will look for the slant first. If they manage to cover the slant then he will look for the fade route, looking to drop it over his outside shoulder. (if it is zone you can often still free up the slant in the undercoverage, or stick the fade vs a cover 2 safety, but it is best as a man play).

Remember what I quoted Spurrier saying? Slants and fades? On this play you do both and the ball gets out much quicker than the Kentucky mesh (3 steps vs 5).

Further Note on Passing Concepts

If you have not yet read my earlier post on concepts I suggest reading that first before this one. Also, I suggest reading this thread on the Chucknduck passing forums.

Anyway, here is more about grouping pass concepts, this time (again via Coach Mountjoy) from Gene Dahlquist:

Another GOOD perspective on "PASSING GAME CONCEPTS" is from Gene Dahlquist (fine QB Coach at U of Texas under John Macovic - who also coached the KC Chiefs, & now coaching in NFL Europe - I believe):

CONCEPTS:

#1 - "PROGRESSIONS" = Reading progressions of receivers only;

#2 - "ONE ON ONES" = FINDING the BEST one on ones thru various types of pre-snap & post-snap reads.

#3 - "ISLOATIONS" - Just isolating 1 receiver on 1 defender on a PARTICULAR route.

#4 - "OPTIONS" - Prime receiver runs an "Option" route vs a defender (with a 4 or 5 way go).

#5 - "TWO AGAINST THE SIDELINE" (Hi/Lo off flat coverage). What I call a "2 Level Vertical Stretch".

#6 - "THREE AGAINST THE SIDELINE" - what I call a "3 Level Vertical Stretch"

#7 - "WORKING THE LEVELS" - three receivers vertically in the middle of the field (also a 3 level vertical stretch, but in mid 1/3 rather than outs. 1/3).

#8 - "THREE DEEP RECEIVERS VS TWO DEEP DEFENDERS" - horizontally stretching a 2 Deep Zone defense.

#9 - "FOUR DEEP RECEIVERS VS THREE DEEP DEFENDERS" - horizontally stretching a 3 Deep Zone defense.

#10 - "TWO RECEIVERS VS ONE DEFENDER UNDERNEATH" - horizontally stretching 1 undercoverage defender in 1/2 of the field.

#11 - "THREE RECEIVERS VS TWO UNDERNEATH DEFENDERS" - horizontally stretching 2 undercoverage defenders in 1/2 of the field.

#12 - "MAN/ZONE COMBINATIONS" - set one side of pattern to handle MAN & set the other side of the pattern to attak zone.

If you check this out, & the NORM CHOW "Concepts" posted earlier (above) - it is two different (& interesting) perspectives on "PASSING GAME CONCEPTS"!

NOTE: To MY way of thinking (CONSTANTLY trying to SIMPLIFY) - I would COMBINE many of the above into FEWER Concepts:

A) HORIZONTAL STRETCH (either INS/OUT OR OUTS/IN) would encompass #'s 8, 9, 10, & 11!

B) VERTICAL STRETCH would encompass #'s 5, 6, & 7!

C) OBJECT RECEIVER READ would encompas #'s 2, 3, & 4!

I wouldn't list #1 ("progressions") as a seperate "PASSING GAME CONCEPT" - because we have "progressions" in MOST of the concepts.

FINALLY - I think that #12 ("COMBINATIONS") is a GREAT concept!

Organizing Pass Plays as "Concepts"

First, anyone interested in a great discussion about understanding passes and how they affect defensive structure should check out this thread from the Chuck n Duck forums.

I want to give lots of credit to Coach Bill Mountjoy who posts on there, as he provided most of the most useful information:

...[Mike] Martz & [Joe] Gibbs are disciples of the [Don] Coryell offense.

You have Horizontal Stretches (Inside/Out, AND Outside/IN) with either 2 on 1, or 3 on 2 (USUALLY in 1/2 of the field - deep OR under).

You have Vertical Stretches with 3 on 2, or 2 on 1 (USUALLY in 1/3 of the field).

You have "Objective Receiver Concepts" (which is with ANY pass in which a specific receiver is primary - such as "OPTION ROUTES", ETC.).

You have read concepts (below) to facilitate the above: NOTE: "MOFO" = MOF OPEN; "MOFC" = MOF CLOSED).

QUARTERBACK READ SYSTEM:
KNOW THE SITUATION
PRE-SNAP LOOK THE DEFENSE – ANTICIPATE
READ ON THE DROP – ADJUST
THINK: PROTECTION/ADJUSTMENTS/PROGRESSION/TIMING/OUTLETS
BEWARE OF THE MIDDLE OF THE FIELD LOOKS – MOFO/MOFC
KNOW THE COVERAGE ELEMENTS:
ZONE 3 DEEP MOFC/2 DEEP MOFO, etc

That's a handful. Quick notes:

Think of a football field as a flat, two dimensional plane. You attack a defense "horizontally" along a line on this plane. For example, in the All-curl, you are horizontally stretching 4 underneath defenders with 5 receivers all looking back at the QB (versus 3-deep. Versus cover 2 they now have 5 underneath defenders: one for every passing lane). Technically some of these receivers are at 3-5 yards and others are at 10, but it constitutes 5 passing lanes for only 4 defenders to cover.

This is what would be a called a "short [or intermediate] in-out horizontal stretch". The QB is reading inside to out (sit route to curl to flat), on a short horizontal stretch. The key is that you have isolated those 4 underneath defenders in a game they can't win: 4 vs 5.

However, to further facilitate reading these things easily, a coach will integrate a coverage key (here the drop of the middle linebacker) where he will then isolate himself into 1/2 of the field. Then, 5 on 4 becomes the more manageable 3 on 2.

Further, a great play is the corner/3-vertical route.



First, it is an example of a "deep out-to-in vertical stretch". You want to run this versus 2-deep, so you are stretching 2 deep defenders with 3 deep receivers. The QB would then pick a side based on the safety key, and read outside in (corner to post). Again, if you can isolate the defenders at this level, it becomes the classic game they can't win: 2 covering 3.

Further, making the play effective is it is also a "hi/lo vertical stretch". In this case you hopefully, on each 1/3 half of the field, can isolate a single sideline defender (the squat-cornerback versus cover 2) who you can attack both high and low, or "hi/lo" with your corner route and your flat--both sideline routes. Essentially this is a 2 on 1.

The point here? You do not win football games and complete passes by creating "one-on-one matchups" unless you have superior talent at each position. You win them by getting a numerical advantage, where it is 5 on 4, or 2 on 1.

We prefer 2 on 1s and they are easier--simply look at the movement of one defender--but the practical problems of properly identifying that key defender and being confident no one else will get into the passing lane are not easy, so you go for 3 on 2, 4 vs 3, or 5 on 4.

This is intended for zones, but how do you attack man? I will save some of these ideas for another article, but suffice to say that many of the best coaches will:

1. Have the individual routes that attack the zone be effective versus man (corner routes, shallow crosses)
2. Integrate certain anti-man concepts within a zone stretching framework (such as the mesh or option routes)
3. Put man combinations to one side and zone combinations to the other. Many of the best NFL and College teams do this quite effectively, and it is still simple to do.

Conclusion

Many of you probably have questions about how a Quarterback actually goes about deciding who to throw to. Even if he has a 5 on 4 situation, how in the world does he quickly determine who to throw to? Coach Mountjoy provides an excellent and quick rundown below:

You can read defenders OR progressions. Examples below:

DISCUSSION OF PROGRESSION READS AND COVERAGE READS

I. PROGRESSION READS: A progression read is designed to have two or three choices of where to go with the ball. It is important to pre-read the coverage to give you an indication of the coverage, but more importantly, it’s knowing where the receivers are going to be with a progression read pattern called. This kind of read calls for throwing the ball with rhythm drops. You might get to the third receiver in the progression as soon as you hit your fifth step on the drop. So when you are stepping forward to throw, you can hit the third receiver in the progression on the same rhythm you would have if you were throwing to the first.

The limitations of progression reads are:
A) There is a tendency to stare at the receiver that is first in the progression attracting other defenders

B) It is frustrating for coaches to watch because they could see the receiver you didn’t throw to was wide open (Coaches need to know the progression of the play as well as the QB); [i.e. QB threw it to the first read who was kinda/maybe open and #3 was uncovered].

C) You will lose patience or think that because you hit the first receiver in the progression he won’t be there when the play is called again. You must have patience and not make up your mind before the ball is snapped.

REMINDERS:
1. Have a plan when you get to the Line of Scrimmage.
2. Stay with the progression.
3. Don’t stare.
4. Progression reads are thrown with rhythm drops.

II. COVERAGE READS: Reading the coverage is normally done in the NFL looking at the pictures that are taken upstairs during the series (when the QB is on the sidelines). In High School & College – the Press Box Coaches do most of the work here. The QB can pre-snap read and get an idea of what might happen. He can see rotations and drops of defenders at the snap of the ball, but may not know what the coverage was. Reading the coverage is really looking at a defender or defenders. Based on what they do you will get to the correct receiver.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS KIND OF A READ ARE:
1. It eliminates the struggle of the progression read trying to determine who was more wide open.
2. It eliminates the QB from making up his mind before the snap (we shouldn’t do this regardless of if we Progression Read OR Read the Coverage). Read the defenders to get you to the right receiver in Coverage Reads.
3. It keeps the QB on the same page as the Coach because they both know the read and the goal of the play called.
4. It doesn’t matter what the coverage is because when you are reading properly you will be hitting the correct receiver.
5. You will not have to stare at your receivers (it will give you natural look offs).
6. You don’t have to know what the entire coverage is (you don’t have to see the whole field). NOTE: In our reads – “Progression” AND “Coverage” – we only read ½ the field Horizontally, or 1/3 of the field Vertically.

The Shallow Cross and the Holy Trinity from Bunch

Making Passes Look Alike Part 2

As discussed in the last article, sending all your receivers vertically is often very difficult to pattern read for zone defenders, safeties, as well as the very disruptive rovers/floaters. However, any quick look at the football landscape reveals that many, many teams successfully use lots of shallow crosses and flat routes. Given the discussion and some doodling on paper this is a surprise. These routes are almost silly: aside from being simple to jump and wall off for many defenders, they often give away what the one or two vertically releasing receivers will do.

However, my point is not that these routes are irrelevant, yet teams should be careful how they use them and it is possible that they are overused. For example, many coaches teach the passing game based on the reaction of one defender. For example, on the curl/flat combination shown below, the coach will say that if the linebacker widens with the flat, throw the curl. However, if the defense wants to, it can always double cover the curl and cover the flat one on one and take it away.



So, briefly, why do teams run these types of routes? Of first importance is who they are run against; often it is linebackers and safeties, who are weaker pass defenders. Second, the throws themselves are often easier than other throws, which can require more timing and the ability to squeeze the ball between defenders--many of these throws are simply underneath defenders.

Third, structurally, they are easy to understand and often easy to read. While this is a fear if the defense is too good, again, simplicity often favors the offense. If I send a player immediately to the flat, then I can quickly see the defense's reaction. If I send two receivers vertical it is not apparent to the QB who the D will eventually leave uncovered.

Lastly, while they (usually) are poor at threatening vertically, they can still be packaged together to create rubs, picks, and mismatches. Whether in the traditional bunch set or simply a shoot route by a running back versus a slower linebacker, we can all envision circumstances that make them effective. Therefore these routes, often better than 3 or 4 vertically releasing receivers are good at causing the defense to put itself in a numbers bind (I.E. three defenders to cover two receivers or four defenders to cover three receivers. This is what can win football games from a strategy point of view.) The point of this article is to show some of the right ways to use them and some of the proper considerations.

I'll begin with the shallow cross series as I have run it, which has a few variations and has come under a few names, including the West Coast "drive" concept, or just shallow cross in mine. It is a simple inside-out read for the QB, who reads the shallow cross, to a curl or in-breaking route, to the flat (or sometimes a wheel route). Sometimes there are backside reads as well, but for now I will just show it with a post route and a backside flat to control the outside linebacker for the crossing receiver.



In the lower left is how Purdue runs the play, which is basically the same even if the techniques are slightly different.

However, no matter how you dress it up, the play does not exist in a vacuum. In my earlier article I talked about the same plays being run from multiple formations. Yet, the D cannot be totally fooled if every time one guy comes in, another pushes vertical, and another goes to the flat. It simply becomes recognition and reaction for the defense; in other words they can pattern read you.

Quickly, I'll show a few other combinations of routes that look similar. First, the now famous mesh/snag/triangle route:



And the follow/angle combination:



Shallow, snag, and follow (which is what I call them--insert Shakespeare's famous question here) form what I call the "Holy Trinity", which are imperative for any good passing team, particularly if you plan to use the bunch packages. Intuitively, you can see the advantage to using these together, but it becomes more apparent if I draw it first as what the stems look like on each play, and then as a branch of possibilities:



Since that looks a bit messy, here is each route individually:



The defense cannot pattern read anymore, because every play is like a kind of dynamic route tree. You've achieved the same equilibrium with these short routes as you had when all your receivers vertically released.

In this case you can still get double teamed, but they will be unable to jump the underneath routes for fear that a shallow may become a whip or that a shoot route may become a wheel or an angle route.

Conclusion

All this is part of making your offense cohesive. Again, no play exists in a vacuum. You do this for the same reason that you run draw plays or that you run your play action passes off of your favorite run plays instead of plays you don't even run. They keep the defense honest and make you difficult to defend. If I have five pass plays but they all look markedly different, I become easier to defend. If I can mix in all the formations, substitutions, and then, even if the defense accurately reads run or pass and can identify the receivers, yet still can't tell if there is a whip or a shallow coming, or a corner or a curl (or a post), then I have been successful.

It doesn't really matter how you integrate it into your system, whether they are separate plays or tags or whatnot, but the important thing is to make it difficult for the D and easy to teach. For the last two diagrams I will show you how Spurrier integrates this same idea into his two favorite pass plays (which, to add to the confusion, are built off his favorite run play, the lead draw).

First, Spurrier loves the curl/corner read play, which I discussed in this article and the common dig/post pass, shown below:



Laid on top of each other, it looks like this to the defense:



He's been doing this for years. Constant three way threats all around, the threat of multiple vertical receivers, including post and corner routes, are all staples of the Old Ball Coach's offense.

Making Pass Plays Look Alike

Pattern reading is one of the most crippling tactics a defense can employ against an unprepared or poorly organized pass offense. Even a successful passing team can suddenly find themselves unable to get anyone open. Think about what it is like trying to throw against your own defense when they all know your plays.

I was actually kidding: if your own defense can always identify what you're doing, then that is probably a sign that you need to rethink things. The issue is that as often as possible the defense should not know for sure where the receivers will wind up until the ball is actually thrown. This is done by making routes look alike.

The first thing is that your eligible receivers must learn how to explode off the ball and make every route look like they are going deep. If a receiver can explode and make the DB think he is going deep, and then has the skills to stop and change direction in two (or sometimes three) steps, then he can always get open versus one defender. Imagine a pass play with four (or five) vertically releasing receivers: each could go deep, stop, or go in or out at any time. Further, no single receiver can afford to be double teamed until the intentions of some of the other receivers have been given away, at which time the ball should already be thrown.

In fact, most 3-step drop passing games and many timing routes look just like this. Below are some diagrams of possible combinations and routes put together (some put together quite casually, not all are vouched for as great plays).

Drawing the route tree can be thought of as showing what it is like for a defensive back: he is backpedaling and he sees all the potential ways that receiver could go. However, if he can pattern read, even if he doesn't know with 100% probability what a receiver is going to do, if he can narrow it down to one or two things, then the offense is on a slippery slope downhill.

So, if defensive backs have a hard time pattern reading vertical releases, then what can they pattern read? Well, they read routes that immediately show where the receiver is going, as shown below:

I.E. Shallow crosses and flat and shoot routes. Or in other words: the bread and butter of many, many football teams' passing games.

Homer Smith wrote a few articles that very convincingly decimated the usefulness of some of these routes, particularly the flat route. You can threaten no more than one defender, who can always take it away. In the world of football strategy, this is not how you win football games. You win football games by isolating your players in one on one matchups that they can win and score against and occupying two defenders with one receiver, thereby creating those one on one matchups. Defenses will trade one for one every single time. Think about what bunching or stacking receivers is intended to do, or the multiple threats that tight ends and H-backs can present.

Moreover, these routes a) are easily covered or "squeezed" by the LBs, b) they usually signal exactly what the vertical releasing WRs are going to do (i.e. if the slot flies to the flat, then the corner knows he will only run a go or a curl, but will not run an out route), and c) does not threaten the deep coverage so the safeties can help double team the downfield receivers.

I used to be a bit more sceptical, but I think it is safe to say that the NFL, from a strategy standpoint, is obviously the most sophisticated football being played at any level. (Though certain strategies, such as many option football strategies, are deemed too risky because of injury to the quarterbacks.) There is simply so much more time, money, and experience at every level of the teams--from players to coaches to technical assistants, and there is too much incentive and reward for success for it not to be.

Thus, I think it would be a fair test to say that if these routes are as useless as they seem to be on paper under careful analysis, then someone would have realized this, whether explicitly removing them on purpose, or implicitly they would get phased out when they analyze piles of play results and use the most successful rotues and packages.

A quick scan of any NFL game will show you that lots and lots of shallow crosses and flat routes are being called, completed, and used successfully. While running the risk of asking the obvious (or simply making the simple complicated), but why?

The first, and probably most important reason, is that these routes are simply shorter and easier to complete than other quarterbacks. Most are less than 6 yards, compared with the vertical stem routes, which are 10-15 yards (at least) downfield, and, knowing that we can use the Pythagorean theorem to determine how far the pass actually needs to go, this could be a 15-25 yard difference between a 5 yard route and a 12 yard route. This is important both because of simple success rates, but also because football teams and quarterbacks are human, psychological beings, and I am a big believer in getting QBs established early with easy throws to get them comfortable.

Second, they do focus on the LBs and the undercoverage, who are often weaker defenders. This is a less strong reason because routes with vertical stems can and still do attack these underneath defenders, but there is no mistaking it with the shorter routes.

Lastly, while you do immediately lose deep threats from the route, you can still create new route trees off these pass releases, creating new uncertainty for defenders, which is what I will discuss in my next article.