The Zone Blitz, Max Pro, and the Super Bowl

ESPN.com's Len Pasquarelli wrote:

"Fooling opposing passers is a strong suit for [Steeler's Defensive coordinator Dick] LeBeau, of course, and there were some occasions, especially in the second half, when Hasselbeck appeared flummoxed. The surprising part is that LeBeau called only a handful of standard zone-blitz defenses against Seattle's passing game.

Pittsburgh blitzed early but, as LeBeau pointed out, the Seahawks were using "max" protection blocking schemes, and "we didn't see anything good that could come from just constantly banging our heads against a wall."

Typical of LeBeau, though, he saved one gambit, one of the most basic zone blitzes, for a critical moment. It came on Seattle's penultimate possession of the game, with Seattle scrambling to scrape back into the contest. On a third-and-8 play from the Pittsburgh 47-yard line, LeBeau called for a "corner fire," and Deshea Townsend roared through a gaping hole to dump Hasselbeck for a five-yard loss, forcing a punt.

On the zone-blitz, linebacker Joey Porter dropped into coverage rather than rushing, and that forced Hasselbeck to hold the ball a count longer than he normally might. Townsend was into the backfield like a heat-seeking missile.

"A great call, perfect timing, one of the oldest zone blitzes we've got, but still a goody," Townsend said after the game. "That's the thing about [LeBeau], he knows when to spring something we haven't used on an opponent. But he also knows he can trust us to deliver. I mean, there we were Saturday night in the hotel, walking through a new coverage that he just drops on us at our team meeting. And we work on it for four or five hours and, for something we've never played before, we get it hashed out. I guess he kind of figured 'better late than never,' and I'm glad he did, because it worked great for us tonight."

I noticed that the Steelers were very selective about their zone blitzes and that Seattle was determined not to go to the Indianapolis route and get trammeled by unblocked Joey Porters on every other play. This corroborates my theory and the Bruce Arians article I quoted saying that you have to max pro vs. the zone blitz, contrary to all the guys recently who keep saying that the Colts and others should have gone five wide. This results in simply more hits on the QB. You can just as easily--if not more easily--let 2-3 receivers find the zone voids and let the other 2-3 guys check out underneath after you've protected your QB. A perfect example was this year's bowl game between Oklahoma and Oregon. Oklahoma had a very mediocre year, Oregon a great one, but Oregon could NOT move the ball and lost because they were obsessed with going 5-wide vs. Oklahoma's man and zone blitzes where their young QBs took shot after shot and they never broke anyone free.

In the article LeBeau, who practically invented the zone blitz, flatly admitted that max (7 and 8 man) protection got them out of zone blitzing. Remember, this is how the Steelers got to the Super Bowl in the first place. It took a further great defensive effort and excellent calls by LeBeau to keep pace, and this was against a Seattle offense scared to death of the zone blitz. Earlier in the article Hasselbeck said:

"You know, it got to the point where I was taking chances, and that was just a poor decision," Hasselbeck said. "It was a chance I shouldn't have taken. I kind of got fooled by the move one guy made [in the secondary], and it was a bad play."

Fooling opposing passers is a strong suit for LeBeau, of course, and there were some occasions, especially in the second half, when Hasselbeck appeared flummoxed. The surprising part is that LeBeau called only a handful of standard zone-blitz defenses against Seattle's passing game. "

This is the strength of the zone-blitz. It is weak against max-pro because there are large zone voids and weaker defenders in pass coverage. Yet, the QB gets impatient, even an NFL guy like Hasselbeck. Instead of hitting his check-downs when they kept him protected he forced too many throws. Sometimes the strength of the scheme is not that it confuses the opponent but merely that it frustrates them. To defeat it you must be both sound and patient.

Has the spread offense reached its apex?

I will discuss a bit of facts about the rise of the spread offense including its various pass and run elements (heavily abridged, each individual chain has its own history), and argue that it has morphed from an equalizing offense, one used by less talented programs to level the playing field, to one that merely amplifies the latent talent, so talented teams can expose mismatched defenders but there are now fewer opportunities for less talented teams and the spread may not be well situated for these "up-and-coming" programs now that it is so popular. At the lower levels it will remain and can continue to thrive where it is well coached as a tool to highlight talented athletes, particularly as more and more good athletes grow up throwing the football and becoming effective passers. The Pros are likely to never catch on to "the zone read" and such plays, just as the traditional option is not widespread in the pros either. Last, the days of the spread as "the next big thing" are over. It is the classic case that when the public at large realizes what's going on and every TV commentator is discussing how innovative you are, you are no longer innovative and someone new is soon to be annointed the next "genius."

Introduction

As an astute commentator pointed out, all four of the BCS bowl winners ran some version (actually a very similar version) of the spread offense. I am not sure if Texas once lined up with two backs in the backfield (not counting Vince Young!). All but Penn St rushed for significantly more than 200 yards in those spread sets, and few would argue that Penn St is not a physical team and they might have been the least spread of all the winners. Of the other teams in the BCS, Pro-Style offensive teams like USC and Notre Dame ran lots of "spread stuff," and in ND's case I think it actually hurt them since their offensive line had difficulty pass protecting.

The zone read was on full display throughout the bowl season. In the West Virginia-Georgia game the TV ran some great shots of the play and explained well who is being read and the idea behind the play. They obviously had lots of examples of great blocking and running to make a believer of nearly anyone. Of course that game featured innovator and Johnny Appleseed of the spread-run game Rich Rodriguez (Tulane, Clemson, and WVU, who spread his knowledge first hand to teams like Northwestern and others who themselves have propogated the offense), but the BCS title game was the crescendo, with a quarterback dependent offense run by maybe its best triggerman ever. Vince Young's performance is well chronicled, with 30 completions in 40 pass attempts (with virtually zero yards after the catch for Texas's receivers) and 200 yards rushing. Last year Alex Smith became the number one pick as a run-pass threat under now-Florida Coach Urban Meyer, who himself won his first bowl-game at Florida. Meyer is considered one of the "gurus" of the spread-O, yet he was a relative neophyte to the offense before going to Bowling Green in 2001, when he studyied and adapted some of the Northwestern and Rodriguez run schemes along with the Louisville Cardinals passing game when John L. Smith (now Michigan St HC), Bobby Petrino (Louisville HC) and Scott Linehan (Miami Dolphins OC) were coaching there.

The offense's rise has been meteoric. I was inundated with questions and articles on Urban Meyer's O and the spread option game were always some of the most trafficked ones on the blog. Next season the schemes will be even more prevalent, especially at the HS level. But where next?

The Pros

Eventually all offenses are tested in the NFL. The final verdict on any scheme or philosophy is eventually tested, chewed up, synthesized, and sent back under the 24 hour/365 day scrutiny that is professional football. Time, money, technology, and the best football minds always level a verdict. Other offenses can survive at lower levels (and often can be more successful than what the Pros themselves do with their more sophisticated passing games and less success of deception based offenses like the Wing-T), but the book will be written at the pro level, or at least adapted by it. The Run and shoot had its weaknesses exposed (primarily the zone blitz) but it also had its best aspects co-opted by nearly every offense. Its mark is real, if subtle.

The difference with the spread offense though is that, unlike the run and shoot or many other "philosophy" offenses, it actually came from the Pros, or at least the spread roots reach back further in the Pros than even at many colleges. The one-back attack as practiced by Dennis Erickson, Mike Price, etc goes back to the old Jack Neuimeier (sp?) offense, but the zone running game and 3 and 4 receiver sets and the shotgun goes back to the Gibbs Redskins, the Buffalo Bills K-Gun, and even the Don Coryell or Sid Gillman offenses. The reason is simple: that's where the quarterbacks were. Dan Fouts, Marino and these other guys were the best players on their teams and coaches as diverse as Coryell and Don Shula had offenses designed to be both quarterback friendly and dependent. (I'm ignoring for the moment the Bill Walsh lineage, but his concepts I think were co-opted a bit later and integrated into the "modern Pro offense" which I think is really a combination of the Walsh West Coast scouting, preparation, timing, etc and the one-back offenses, some of the concepts pre-date as well as post-date Walsh's reign.)

Further, the "spread" is not so different than what the Pros currently do. Watch Texas Tech and they will run the "mesh" six ways from Sunday. Watch the Colts, and they will run it a bunch too. The big question then becomes, what about all this spread-to-run business?

The question has two answers. One, many teams already do this, as evidenced by how many teams are one-back oriented. Watch the top running teams in the NFL: the Chiefs, Broncos, and the like, and they will spread to run a good percentage of the time. Even the Redskins, a power team, like to use lots of motion and multi-receiver sets to get the D thinking pass before using H-backs to kick out, pull, or lead into the hole.

The second question is, what about the quarterbacks? The Falcons have been one of the best rushing teams in the NFL for the past few seasons, due in no small part to Michael Vick. They run lots of bootleg with him off of the outside zone and inside zone runs, for the same reason that Texas or West Virginia run the zone read: to get double-teams on the playside and either make the backside defensive end stay home or pay with a big QB run. Yet, the Falcons haven't gone to the zone-read. Vick has been injured at times. We see big rushing days by a Donovan McNabb or even good runs by a Jake Plummer, but where are the 100 yard rushing days we have seen from Vince Young, Troy Smith, or even guys like Alex Smith or Northwestern's old QB Zak Kustok?

First, the common argument against this is the team speed of the NFL defenses. The spread works best when you have great one-on-one matchups. Texas and Ohio St. are so dangerous because they force you to "pick your poison" and leave one-on-one either the receivers, RBs, or the QB. USC played at least one and mostly two safeties deep nearly the whole game. When Pete Carroll did blitz he often brought zone blitzes--surprisingly afraid of getting beat deep by the outside receivers of Texas. Consequently Young picked them apart but also ran the ball so well. The argument is at the pros the speed of the defense can nullify some of this. The Pro safeties can defend the deep ball and stick your QB for no gain.

I think the better argument though is simply the nature of the league. The problem isn't only that those safeties can range the whole field, it is that when they hit your QB they send him to the hospital. The NFL already can't keep their signal callers healthy for a whole season: McNabb and Vick have both constantly battled injuries, but so have far less mobile QBs like Chad Pennington, Rex Grossman, Culpepper, etc. Can you imagine the Colts, with Peyton Manning--all $50 million+ of him--running a QB run of any kind with that much at risk? No first down is worth losing your franchise.

The harsh fact is that financially, Vince Young costs the school just as much as his backup: one scholarship. Even more, Peyton Manning, Brady, McNabb, these guys are your team for 10+ years. At most you get four years from a college QB. More likely you get two seasons. The "spread" may actually make Vince Young's decision to go to the Pros for him. Were he to return, could he request that the coaches not run him as much, to reduce his likelihood of injury? Keep another guy in to protect him more so he doesn't take as many shots? The spread has always given up shots to its QBs; the good ones just get the ball out first.

At the Pro level these risks are unacceptable, with fan-bases, cap room, and playoff hopes all riding on their signal caller.

Big-Time College

Certainly next year it will be everywhere. The big issue though is what do the small teams do now? It used to be that you could "get good" by being a spread team. In just the last four years Urban Meyer resuscitated two programs and cashed in at Florida, in no small part by being a "spread guy." When Ohio St and Texas are running the same offense as you and scoring 50 points, how can you sell yourself as being "different" and "wide open"?

Being spread is simply no longer enough. Some of the most inept offensive performances I've seen this year were by "spread teams." I watched Oregon get dismantled with their spread O in the bowl game, as they went 5-wides a majority of the time. This is an unwise move when the defense has five covermen who can cover your receivers man to man and when their front 4 or 5 can break a guy free vs. your OL nearly everytime. They had far more success and were less predictable when they added TEs and RBs and used more misdirection and/or power. Their OC is Gary Crowton, another spread guru from the Louisiana Tech days who had a mediocre Pro stint and an up-and-down campaign at BYU.

Purdue this year, a staple of spread offenses and hero who went from perpetual loser to Rose Bowls and Big 10 contention, continued their downward offensive spiral, as their defense, which had continued to prop them up over the past few years collapsed as well. Purdue over the past few seasons has run into the same problem Oregon had. In the beginning, when they started spreading four and five wides even Michigan or Ohio St did not have five good covermen. Now even Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin and the like all have 6 or 7 good ones. Result? Lots of 3 and 4 yard passes and even more plays with five receivers out and zero open.

The offense has arguably become the opposite of an equalizer, it has become an amplifier: if you are talented you can really rack up the points because no one can cover Vince Young, Ted Ginn or the like one-on-one, but if you're not, you just get sacked and no one gets open. Purdue even tried to add the spread option stuff this year but an offensive line that could not get movement and a lack of playmakers stunted the offense's production.

I think the O has reached its apex as savior. Coaches are not going to get fat contracts anymore based on being "spread." There will be holdouts and the good coaches, Rodriguez and the like, are going to continue to win games and move the ball because they are great teachers and believe in what they do, but something else is going to have to be "the rage." (If I had to predict something I would have said the jet/fly offense, but it has not caught on as much as I'd thought, and its success appears inversely proportional to team speed. I saw a youth team score 50 with it, HS teams are winning championships, College teams have already begun to drop it after LSU scored twice on it in the Nat'l championship game, and I saw two pro teams run it this year, both for loss of yardage.)

Lower Levels/HS, etc

It's harder to predict where this will go, as I can guarentee 20 years from now there are going to be some "true spread teams" and "spread run teams" lingering just as there are successful double-wing, wing-t, run and shoot, and splitback veer teams. Well coached and coordinated offenses will continue to be successful. I also think that putting your best player at the "Vince Young QB" spot is a great way to win football games. The days of having an I-back and just feeding your best guy carries and having a statue at QB who throws 5 passes a game is (mercifully!) about over.

Why is that? This is a whole other discussion, but the big reason I think is the proliferation of information on good quarterbacking. Instead of one or two kids who can throw a decent spiral and a couple guys around a city who know a few decent QB drills, now there are books, manuals, videos etc for parents, kids, coaches alike. Lots of kids, from inner-city to suburban can learn the fundamentals of quarterbacking. There is no reason that "athletes" can't throw the ball, at least well enough for HS. There might be issues that arise later in College or the Pros with complex coverages, but if I had a 4.5 guy who could throw a bit running my offense, I guarentee you I can win some games.

Further, the "spread" and the "zone read" do force the defense to account for all 11 men. The safeties must step up for the QB, as he is another threat, thus putting either your RB running against reduced fronts, or receivers one-on-one. This is logical and good football. Again though, as teams get better at defending it, can the team with 19 kids on varsity run this as an equalizer? Uncertain. It is unlikely to help as much as maybe it has in the past.

Conclusion

This was meant as a brief overview. The "spread" can be many different things, but it is not so new. This is probably why it is both so effective and why its rise (and predicted decline) has been so fast.

The big issues are that no longer can I be "different" from the other teams in my conference or in the state by being a spread guy. Second, teams see it more and can defend better. It still is a great way to highlight great players, and, being so QB intensive, a great player can be extremely effective, particularly at the lower levels. At the Pros, too much money and the risk of injuries appear too great to put total emphasis on the QB, as there already exists so much. Great players may come along though and prove me wrong, but Walter Peyton with a cannon running QB for a team, even if he wins a title, may or may not disprove my theory.

St. Louis Rams Shallow Cross Concepts

While not as prolific as they were just a few years ago, the Rams under offensive coordinator and head coach Mike Martz were maybe the best passing offense of all time. They set a gazillion scoring and passing records, and now teams like the Chiefs and Cardinals run their offense verbatim and others like the Bengals run extremely similar schemes. The offense itself goes way back to the Don Coryell and Sid Gillman days, as interpreted by guys like Ernie Zampese and Norv Turner.

The vertical passing game is well documented and very important (in fact they run the 3-vertical I link to in the previous post), but the shallow cross has been a great tool for them to hit passes underneath the fast dropping linebackers and to get good matchups with speed receivers getting rubs and running away from man to man for big play potential.

The Rams integrate the shallow cross into four main concepts: drive/cross-in combo (same side), hi-lo (shallow/in opposite sides), mesh, and the choice.

Running the Route

The route is designed to be run at a depth of 5-6 yards. It is mandatory that it at least crosses the center, and often can be caught on the opposite side of the field (in fact many pro-teams use the shallow as a way to attack and control the opposite flats). Here is the route shown vs. both man and zone and some coaching points:



1. First step is directly upfield. Vs. press man stutter step and get inside position.
2. Rub underneath any playside receivers inside of you.
3. Initially aim for the heels of the defensive linemen
4. Cross center. Aim for 5-6 yards on opposite hash.
5. Read man or zone (described below)
6. Vs. zone settle in window facing QB past the center-line (usually past the tackle). Get shoulders square to QB, catch the ball and get directly upfield.
7. Vs. man staircase the route (shown above, push upfield a step or two) and then break flat across again and keep running. No staircasing when running mesh.

Reading man or zone: After your initial step, eye the defenders on the opposite side of the centerline. Two questions: who are they looking at? and what does their drop look like?

If they are looking at the receivers releasing to their side and turning their shoulders to run with those receivers, it is probably man (on mesh look if they are following the opposite receiver).

If they are dropping back square and looking at either the QB or at you, it is probably zone. Expect to settle. Even if it is zone and there is nothing but open space, keep running; we'd rather hit a moving receiver than a stationary one.

Now, onto the concepts themselves.

Drive/Shallow-in

The first is the "drive" concept, as taught in the west coast offense. You can find a great article on the classic form of the play common to west coast offense teams here. Here is a diagram below:



This is the most versatile of all the shallow-cross routes, and my personal favorite. The in route is run at 14-15 yards (can shorten to 10-12 for H.S.) and the corner is a 14 yard route (can also be shortened to 10-12).

The Rams typically use two different reads on the play, depending if it is man or zone. Against man the read is shallow->in->corner (RB dump off). Against zone it is a hi-lo: corner (or wheel), in, to shallow.

The shallow and sometimes a quick flat are good options built in against blitz, and the play can be run from many formations, including the bunch.

Below are some variants. On the right, is incorporating an angle route into the play, and it always gets read inside to out. On the left, the play is run from a balanced one-back set, and the backside can have almost any two-man combination used. Below the smash is shown, but it could be curl/flat, out/seam, post-curl, or any other combination. Typically a pre-snap or post-snap determination can be made based on man/zone or whether the coverage rotates strong.



Hi/Lo

The hi/lo shallow concepts is similar to how Texas Tech/Mike Leach and the other Airraid gurus run their shallow series. For more info, try the link. Below is what the Rams do.



The in route is at 15 yards as is the post route. Both can be shortened to 10-12 for lower levels. The frontside corner is run at 15 and is only thrown vs. certain man looks.

The base read is in->shallow->RB dump-off. (As a footnote, Texas Tech reads it always shallow->in->RB. I think this is probably the better read for lower levels QBs, since it ensures they will get the ball off quickly and get a sure completion, only throwing the route over the middle when the defenders maul/jump the shallow.)

Also, versus quarters coverage the Rams like to look through the In to the Post route. The idea is that if the safety jumps the In they can hit the post up top behind him. Typically the weak safety (to in/post side) is watched on the early part of the drop, and if he comes up for whatever reason (probably to cover when a blitz is on!) the post becomes the #1 read.

The pass on the right is read the exact same, just some of the responsibilities are switched.

Mesh

The mesh route has extensive literature and discussion on it and the intricasies of the meshing receivers can be found elsewhere. The basic gist is that two receivers cross over the middle getting a rub, which is very effective versus man. Sometimes it also can be a horizontal stretch against zones with four underneath men. Martz has adjusted the play so instead of a frontside corner hi/lo read or even a post to take the top off like Norm Chow likes, he has the Z receiver running a curl at 12 yards over the center. What happens then is it floods the underneath zones with four defenders to cover five receivers, just like on all-curl. So it is a very effective man and zone play. Also, almost always at least one of the two receivers threatening the flats will run a wheel route, giving a deep option.



The QB will get a pre-snap read for the wheel route, basically checking to see if a LB has him in man and/or if the deep defender to that side might squeeze down with no immediate deep threat. The read is then right to left, X-Z-Y, or shallow, in, shallow. Again, as before, the shallows will look to settle vs. zone but they need to get a little wider here. Also, as explained elsewhere for the mesh the Y sets the top of the mesh at 6 yards and X comes underneath at 5. It is best if they can cross going full speed, but must navigate the LBs and undercoverage (and the ref!). If all is covered vs. zone the ball can be dropped off to the flat to the RB or tight end/H-back.

Choice

The Rams call the play with numbers and will tag either the post/middle read or the shallow so I'm not sure what they call it, but the play is adapted from the old run and shoot choice route. The choice route has been successful for teams for years, and the Rams are only happy to incorporate its concepts.

However, while the choice is typically read from the single receiver side over, the Rams read it opposite, with the single receiver side the late read and the middle-read the primary. The play is really intended as a spring to a slot receiver or RB in the seam with the ability to read on the fly.



They change the reads up for the post/seam pattern here run by F and H, but essentially it is similar to the middle read on the 3-vertical play, where he reads MOFO or MOFC and looks to attack the deep middle against open coverage and break flat across underneath a deep middle safety. The Rams also give him the option to break it off against blitzes and, in the case of getting H out in the second diagram, versus "wide" coverage (i.e. a LB squatting outside waiting for him to go to the flat) he can stick it at the LOS or just beyond and run an angle back inside (it helps to have Marshall Faulk!).

The read is post-read->shallow->comeback/flat read. So if they squeeze the post-read the shallow is next and then the QB works the comeback and the flat off a hi/lo read. In the second diagram the seam just clears out or breaks off his route if there is a blitz.

I suggest against having hot reads and sight adjustments to both sides combined with a multi-direction read route unless you are the St. Louis Rams. It is still an excellent play if you keep at least 6 in to block and let the shallow be the hot read, or you can even run it as a 7 man protection if you take away the backside comeback route.

Conclusion

That's a brief overview of the various ways they go about it and the reads. A HS team needs one, maybe two ways of doing this. Lots of teams have been successful using some of these. Florida State won a championship and Charlie Ward a Heisman trophy running the drive version, where if the D dropped off and covered the shallow, swing, and curl, he ran a draw. All of these are high percentage throws. Remember: speed in space! It's a motto that scores points and wins games.

Corner Routes/3-Verticals

Just wanted to mention that I watched the bowl game between Arizona St and Rutgers, and Arizona St used the 3-vertical play at least 10 if not 15 times. Rutgers runs a lot of Cover 2 (HC Schiano came from Miami where he did the same thing) and this is maybe the best play against it. They ran it from all kinds of sets, from gun, with play action, etc. ASU racked up over 600 yards of offense and I swear at least 200 or 250 and several TDs came off this one pass play. Check out this old article I did on the play here.

Norm Chow on Playcalling

Grabbed this from this article here. But this was too good so it got its own article. We all like to discuss coverages, etc but this is extremely true:

We are going to try to take advantage of what the other team is doing on defense. During the course of a game, with the sophistication of defenses, coverages are disguised and the use of zone blitzes and fire blitzes become very hard to beat. We’d be lying if we said we sat up in the box and knew what coverages were being run. What we try to do is take a portion of the football field, the weak flat for example, and we will attack that until we can figure out what the defense’s intentions are. Then we try to attack the coverage that we see. It is very difficult to cover the whole field. We are not going to try to fool anybody. We are going to take little portions of the field and try to attack them until the defense declares what it intends to do.

That is wisdom right there. First, to admit that you can't stand back and make magical judgments about what the defense is doing or what its intentions are. Second, the proper response is to try to turn the game into something manageable--i.e. attacking these "portions" of the field with mirrored reads, flood routes, etc.

Here's another good one:

Number one, we are going to protect the quarterback. If you decide to rush seven, we will block seven. If you decide to rush 10, we will try to block 10. We are going to try to protect the quarterback. Lance and Roger spend a lot of time picking up blitzes and that is the basic tenet that we have. You may be better than we are, but schematically we will try to protect the quarterback.

How often is this forgotten! I am a spread guy, I have roots of the pro-spread, the run and shoot, and there is a fact that the defense can always bring one more than you can protect, but protection first is the proper mindset. Hot routes are not what you build your offense on and you do not declare that you are a four wide team and that this fact is immutable. You have the ability to adapt to different defensive responses and protect your kid back there who is trying to find receivers without getting his head taken off.

Airraid Info

I'm pretty swamped the next couple of weeks, so I'll do the "lazy blogger" technique and post some links and info, this time all about the Airraid offense, in honor of the Mike Leach article that came out yesterday.

If you want to learn more I suggest checking out the Valdosta St/Chris Hatcher tapes on the Airraid offense and routes for the Y receiver/tight end.

Practice, Drills, Teaching:

Nike Coach of the Year Clinic - Hal Mumme (1999)
Nike Coach of the Year Clinic - Mike Leach (1998) - Great article
Hal Mumme Practice Plan

Schemes and articles:

Hal Mumme Clinic Notes - Shallow Cross Series
Valdosta St - Chris Hatcher - Crossing Routes
Texas Tech - 4 Verticals Package

Playbooks

Valdosta St - Spring Playbook
Chucknduck Site - Airraid (from 1999 Oklahoma Playbook)

Remember, they got much of their offense from BYU's offense from the 80s and, even today has lots of similarities with what Norm Chow did at BYU, NC State, and Southern Cal.

Norm Chow - BYU Passing Game Article - Great Article!
Chucknduck - BYU Passing game
Playbook - BYU 1995

Last, here are Norm Chow's reads for his passing plays (see the Chucknduck link for quick reference to diagrams). The reads for the Airraid are very similar, if not the same in all respects.

NORM CHOW POST SNAP READS – “60 SERIES”

“61 Y OPTION” – 5 step drop. Eye Y and throw it to him unless taken away from the outside by S/S (then hit Z), OR inside by ILB (then hit FB). Don’t throw option route vs. man until receiver makes eye contact with you. Vs. zone – can put it in seam. Vs. zone – no hitch step. Vs. man – MAY need hitch step.

“62” MESH – 5 step drop. Take a peek at F/S – if he’s up hit Z on post. Otherwise watch X-Y mesh occur – somebody will pop open – let him have ball. Vs. zone – throw to Fullback.

“63” DIG – 5 step drop and hitch (7 steps permissible). Read F/S: X = #1; Z = #2; Y OR HB = #3.

“64” OUT– 5 step drop. Key best located Safety on 1st step. Vs. 3 deep look at F/S – if he goes weak – go strong (Z = #1 to FB = #2 off S/S); if he goes straight back or strong – go weak (X = #1 to HB = #2 off Will LB). Vs. 5 under man – Y is your only choice. Vs. 5 under zone – X & Z will fade.

“65” FLOOD ("Y-Sail") – 5 step drop and hitch. Read the S/S. Peek at Z #1; Y = #2; FB = #3. As you eyeball #2 & see color (F/S flash to Y) go to post to X. Vs. 2 deep zone go to Z = #1 to Y = #2 off S/S.

“66” ALL CURL– 5 step drop and hitch. On your first step read Mike LB (MLB or first LB inside Will in 3-4). If Mike goes straight back or strong – go weak (X = #1; HB = #2). If Mike goes weak – go strong (Y = #1; Z = #2; FB = #3). This is an inside-out progression. NOT GOOD vs. 2 deep 5 under.

“67” CORNER/POST/CORNER ("Shakes") – 5 step drop and hitch. Read receiver (WR) rather than defender (Corner). Vs. 2 deep go from Y = #1 to Z = #2. Vs. 3 deep read same as “64” pass (Will LB) for X = #1 or HB = #2. Equally good vs Cover 2 regardless if man OR zone under.

“68 SMASH” SMASH– 5 step drop and hitch. Vs. 2 deep look HB = #1; FB = #2 (shoot); Z = #3. Vs. 3 deep – stretch long to short to either side. Vs. man – go to WR’s on “returns”.

“69 Y-CROSS/H-Option – 5 step drop - hitch up only if you need to. Eye HB: HB = #1; Y = #2. QB & receiver MUST make eye contact vs. man. Vs. zone – receiver finds seam (takes it a little wider vs. 5 under). Only time you go to Y is if Will LB and Mike LB squeeze HB. If Will comes & F/S moves over on HB – HB is “HOT” and will turn flat quick and run away from F/S. Otherwise HB runs at his man to reinforce his position before making his break.

That should give plenty of insight into the Airraid! If you want to learn more than this, contact Texas Tech and/or Valdosta St. Both are quite generous with their time (I think Leach even has a session for HS coaches in the sprin). The best (and some might say only) way to learn an offense is to visit and watch them put it in.

Additional materials would be the Valdosta videos, and actually Norm Chow has a great video floating around about his offense, from back in the BYU days.

Reading the "square" to determine coverage

I didn't invent this, but thought I'd pass it along. Sorry that I don't have any diagrams, those would help. From what I remember a lot of this came from Lindy Infante, but it's been used by lots of great passing coaches for a long time. This deescription is close to what I've always taught:

POST-SNAP READS (“READING THE SQUARE”):

The most important area for determining secondary coverages is the middle of the field about 15 to 25 yards deep and about 2 yards inside of each hash. We call this area the “square”.

We normally read the “square” in our drop back passing game. Reading the “square” becomes necessary when it is impossible to determine what the coverage they are in before the snap or to make sure of secondary coverage after the snap.

In reading the “square” the QB simply looks down the middle of the field. He should not focus on either Safety but see them both in his peripheral vision.

A) If neither Safety shows up in the “square”, and both are deep, it will indicate a form of Cover 2. A quick check of Corner alignment and play will indicate whether it is a 2/Man or 2/Zone. If neither Safety shows up in the “square” and both are shallow, it will indicate a Cover 0 (blitz look).

B) If the Strong Safety shows up in the “square”, this will indicate a Cover 3 rolled weak or possibly a Cover 1.

C) If the Weak Safety shows up in the “square”, this will indicate a strong side coverage. It could be a Cover 3 or a Cover 1. If the coverage is Cover 3, it could be a Cover 3/Sky (Safety), or a Cover 3/Cloud (Corner), depending on who has the short zone.

NOTE: When either of the Safeties shows up in the “square”, the best percentage area to throw the ball in is the side that he came from! If NEITHER of the Safeties show up in the “square” – throwing the ball into the “square” is a high percentage throw.